Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis, is predominantly known for his conception of the id, ego and super-ego, representing a part of his meta-psychology of the psychic apparatus. Nowadays, with the advancements in technology and science, his meta-psychological structural model of the psyche might be either confirmed or denied by comparing the account of the psychic apparatus of the classical psychoanalysis to the newest findings in neuropsychology and cognitive neuroscience. Indeed, the founded interdisciplinary project of neuro-psychoanalysis strives to answer such questions. In this article, the current thinking on the discussions around Freudian ego and its possible brain correlates is presented. In 2010, Robin Carhart-Harris and Karl Friston introduced a neuro-psychoanalytic account of the psychic apparatus, where the ego correlated with a large-scale brain network called the default-mode network. In the end of this paper, an original theoretical hypothesis is offered, supplemented with review of the literature, namely that the central-executive network and the salience network are viewed as the true representatives of Freudian ego. The offered hypothesis criticizes Carhart-Harris and Friston's postulating of the default-mode network as being the brain representative of Freudian ego.
as hypothetical models (Kitcher, 1995, pp. 39-45) . The topographical model of the psychic apparatus comprises the unconscious, the preconscious and the conscious parts of the psyche. By definition, every model has to remain hypothetical but opened to improvement. The structural model of the psyche has three elements: the id, the ego and the superego. The function of the id is to provide the psycho-energetic power or drive to the psyche. The ego, on the other hand, strives to maintain a homeostatic condition, even in the face of the struggle between the desires of the id and the values of the superego. Lastly, the superego represents an internalized variant of high-level societal ethical and moral norms. Freud himself uses the metaphor of the horse and the rider to represent the interaction between the ego as the rider and the id as the horse (Freud, 1933 (Freud, /1993 ). Interestingly and intriguingly, the same metaphor can be found also in Plato's oeuvre "Phaedrus" (Thompson, 1868, p. 73-74) .
With regard to neuroscience, it has to be emphasized that Freud opinionated that "our mental topography has for the present nothing to do with anatomy; it is concerned not with anatomical locations, but with regions in the mental apparatus, irrespective of their possible situation in the body" (Freud, 1915 ). This moment represents Freud's terminative departure from pure neurology towards pure speculative psychology.
Even nowadays there are many misunderstandings of the concept of the ego. Freud himself explained the ego as having the tasks of self-preservation, controlling movements and assigns two aspects to it, namely an internal aspect and an external one. Freud writes: "As regards external events, it performs that task by becoming aware of stimuli, by storing up experiences about them (in the memory), by avoiding excessively strong stimuli (through flight), by dealing with moderate stimuli (through adaptation) and finally by learning to bring about expedient changes in the external world to its own advantage (through activity). As regards internal events, in relation to the id, it performs that task by gaining control over the demands of the drives, by devising whether they are to be allowed satisfaction, by postponing that satisfaction to times and circumstances favourable in the external world or by suppressing their excitation entirely" (Freud, 1938 (Freud, /1940 .
The exact function of the ego, in summary, according to Freud, is the following:
[…] the ego is that which knows and that which can be known […] while the id consists of "the dark, inaccessible part of our personality […] the ego is also an agency that controls and initiates action whereas the id can only act through influencing the ego […] Just as the id is directed exclusively to obtaining pleasure, so the ego is governed by considerations of safety […] Due to the id's lack of concern for external reality and safety, the ego assumes the role of an executive agent […] As a frontiercreature, the ego tries to mediate between the world and the id, to make the id pliable to the world and, by means of its muscular activity, to make the World fall in with the wishes of the id" […] the ego is viewed as a regulating agent in charge of balancing the demands of the "irrational" id, super-ego, and constraints of the external world […] The ego functions here via cognitive activity and perception, anticipating danger, and both preparing responses and inhibiting action (Freud, cited in Boag, 2014, p. 2) .
The ego strives to maintain the inner psychic homeostasis by applying the reality principle, that is, by slowing, modulating, transforming, inhibiting and controlling the forces of the id or avoiding accumulation of excitation, which gives rise to reasoning and executive functioning (Freud, 1900 (Freud, /1997 ).
Freud thought of the ego first as a bodily ego (Freud, 1923 (Freud, /1961 . In this line of reasoning, Sletvold suggests that: "It [the ego] is the combined experience of the external world and the state of our own body that somehow lays the foundation for 'the feeling of our self, of our own ego'" (Sletvold, 2013 (Sletvold, , p. 1022 .
Current Hypotheses About the Brain Correlate of Freudian Ego:

A Review
Nowadays, psychologists, psychoanalysts, philosophers, neuroscientists and other scholars unite together to uncover the enigma around the construction of the Freudian ego. Even a special discipline called neuro-psychoanalysis has been founded to answer such questions (Cusumano & Raz, 2014; Panksepp & Solms, 2012; Solms & Turnbull, 2016) . The concept of self is also implicated in deep debates in neurophenomenology, neuro-philosophy, neuropsychology and neuro-psychoanalysis (Gallagher, 2000; Northoff, 2013; Northoff et al., 2006) . For example, the self is regarded as constituted of qualia, as being pre-reflective or unintentional, extended or autobiographical self, an interpreter, a narrative self, a dialogical self, an emotional self, a spatial self, a verbal self, "minimal" self, proto or bodily "self", or in, general, as being qualified as "mineness" (Northoff et al., 2006, p. 440) . However, such constructs, to the author's knowledge, are not researched with relation to Freudian meta-psychology. To be noted, the concept of self, however, differs from the concept of ego used in Freudian meta-psychology. Freudian ego is part of a structure executing particular functions, whereas the self is an experience, having the property of "mineness".
In the last two decades three large-scale brain networks were discovered, which are listed in Table 1 and which take major functional positions in the mind-brain complex (Bressler & Menon, 2010; Carhart-Harris & Friston, 2010; Menon, 2015; Menon & Uddin, 2010; Seeley et al., 2007) . These three networks are the central-executive network (CEN), the default-mode network (DMN) and the salience network (SN). In Table 1 and Table 2 , the anatomy and the functionality of the three networks, as well as the meta-psychological dichotomy of Freudian primary and secondary thought processes are listed (see Table 1 and Table 2 , respectively). According to Menon (Menon, 2011, p. 500; Menon, 2015, p. 605) , SN should be identified as the ultimate controller in the human brain. The network basically controls and regulates the switching between DMN and CEN. SN receives sensory signals and, moreover, it receives signals from the autonomic nervous system and strives to maintain the homeostasis of the mind-brain complex.
In cognitive neuroimaging of the self, the focus is on self-referential processing, a process of thoughts with reference to the self (Kelley et al., 2002) . Many brain regions were identified to be correlated to it. Such regions comprise the following ones: "ventro-and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, lateral parietal cortex, bilateral temporal poles, insula, and subcortical regions, including brain stem, colliculi, periaqueductal gray (PAG), and hypothalamus/hypophysis […] the medial orbital prefrontal cortex (MOFC), the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), the sub/pre-and supragenual anterior cingulate cortex (PACC, SACC), the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), the medial parietal cortex (MPC), the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and the retrosplenial cortex (RSC) [cortical midline structures (CMS)]" (Northoff et al., 2006, pp. 441-442) .
In particular, it is established that the functional integrity of the default-mode network is disrupted under the influence of psychotomimetic drugs, such as psychedelic compounds, inducing a state characterized by an "ego [or self] dissolution" i (Carhart-Harris et al., 2013, p. 8; Carhart-Harris et al., 2014, p. 2) . In fact, both the internal-
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ly-oriented default-mode network and the externally-oriented central-executive network are activated by psychedelic drugs as is the salience network, but their inner dynamic coherence or functional synchronization is disrupted. This leads to a state of an "unconstrained cognition", a state characterized by a partial or complete absence of the regulatory functions of the ego or the self (Carhart-Harris et al., 2012, p. 1).
Finally, many authoritative authors identify or are prone to identify the default-mode network (DMN) as a brain representative or a brain correlate of the Freudian ego, arguing that it is the ultimate master, regulator or con- Lemogne, Delaveau, Freton, Guionnet, & Fossati, 2012; Northoff, 2011, p. 100; Northoff, 2012; Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004; Speth et al., 2016; Tagliazucchi et al., 2016) . These authors consider the self as being identical to Freudian ego. Therefore, any self-referential processing, according to them, is a function of the ego. In fact, the ego is rather a salience detector with the additional ability through efferent connections to induce motoric actions or to "ignite" imagery. The important question here is which network of the abovementioned three (Funahashi, 2001, p. 149; Koechlin, Ody & Kouneiher, 2003 , p. 1181 3. high-level cognitive functions, such as control of attention and working memory (Bressler & Menon, 2010, p. 277) 4. elaboration of plans (Barbey & Patterson, 2011, pp. 5-7) 5. environmentally-focused information processing (Palaniyappan, White & Liddle, 2012 , p. 2326 6. cognitive control (Koechlin, Ody & Kouneiher, 2003 , p. 1181 1. integrating sensory input with visceral, autonomic and hedonic input (Seeley et al., 2007 (Seeley et al., , pp. 2353 (Seeley et al., -2354 2. interoceptive feedback, emotions, homeostatic regulation and reward processing (Seeley et al., 2007 (Seeley et al., , pp. 2353 (Seeley et al., -2354 3. salience detection and action on identified salience (Menon & Uddin, 2010, pp. 655-656; Seeley et al., 2007 Seeley et al., , pp. 2349 Seeley et al., , 2352 Note. Adapted from Dimkov, 2015 large-scale brain networks is the master in the brain, if there is one at all. Is the brain solely a circus without a master?
Discussion -An Introduction of an Original Hypothesis: A
Critique of Current Hypotheses About the Brain Correlate of
Freudian Ego
The hypothetical positions of Friston (2010, 2012) that the default-mode network is the brain correlate of Freudian ego and that it represents the ultimate master of the brain have already been criticized.
For example, Rizzolatti, Semi, and Fabbri-Destro (2014, p. 147 ; emphasis added) comment critically that: "The ego of Friston and Carhart-Harris appears to be not involved in secondary (logically structured) processes but rather in primary processes characterizing that part of ego that mediates unconscious process. In fact, DMN is active when mind is free to wander towards past memories, future projects, and previous personal experiences […] It appears, therefore, that the DMN might correspond to that part of Ego that Freud considered as unconscious". This view of DMN points towards an involvement of this large-scale brain network in primary process thinking (ideation), a function of the id, not of the ego per se.
Starting from the critical position of Rizzolatti, Semi, and Fabbri-Destro (2014) and building upon it, Dimkov (2015, pp. 42-46) rejected the hypothesis of Carhart-Harris and Friston (2010, 2012) as being inconsistent (see also Menon, 2011, p. 500; Menon, 2015, p. 605 ). Dimkov's arguments are the following (Dimkov, 2015, pp. 42-46). First, it has been established that salience network (SN) monitors both internal (somatic) and external environments (Menon, 2011, p. 500; Menon, 2015, p. 605) . When a salient feature is detected, either positive or negative, salience network engages the central executive network (CEN). Then both CEN and SN search for the most appropriate response. Finally, a motor action is executed. When SN and CEN systems are overloaded, the default-mode network (DMN) is activated. DMN mediates three types of thinking, namely spontaneous thinking, stimulus-independent thinking and mind-wandering (Beaty et al., 2014, p. 1) , which all represent lowlevel thought processes, which are imaginative. Moreover, it has been found that DMN is active when individuals are engaged in internally focused tasks such as "autobiographical memory retrieval, envisioning the future, and conceiving the perspectives of others" (Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008, p. 1) . These functions appear as low-level secondary thought processes (i. e., imaginative thought processes) (Beaty et al., 2014, p. 1) or even as primary process ideation, because they are related to thinking processes, such as spontaneous thinking, stimulus-independent thinking and mind-wandering. As the boundary between the primary and the secondary processes is not a clear-cut one, the concept of a third thought process was developed to fill this gap (Dimkov, 2015 (Dimkov, , 2016 (Dimkov, , 2018 . The latter uses simultaneously both primary and secondary thought processes. Thus, DMN's functions can be identified as third process thinking.
It has been found that CEN and DMN are functionally antagonistic, so that the former inhibits the latter (Chen et al., 2013) . There is an anti-correlation between the two networks with interesting characteristics such as the following one: "the high degree of temporal anti-correlation between the DMN and task-positive network [CEN/SN] is thought to reflect a low frequency toggling between their associated psychological functions of introspective and self-referential thought and extrospective attentional orienting, respectively, allowing an individual to remain alert to unexpected environmental events" (Broyd et al., 2009, p. 282) . Moreover, SN also negatively regulates DMN in such a way that when SN is active DMN gets deactivated (anti-correlation) (Chen et al., 2013) . Importantly, SN regulates the interactions or the dynamic switching between CEN and DMN (Bressler & Menon, 2010; Di & Biswal, 2014) . SN is defined as a system that integrates sensory input with visceral, autonomic and hedonic input, interoceptive feedback, emotions, homeostatic regulation and reward processing (Seeley et al., 2007 (Seeley et al., , pp. 2353 (Seeley et al., -2354 . The functions of SN and CEN apparently correspond to the theoretical construct of Freudian ego (the rider). DMN appears to be related to cognitive control, low-level secondary process thinking (Beaty et al., 2014, p. 1) ii , and primary process ideation (the horse). In sum, "the default mode network (DMN) […] is preferentially activated during times of introspection and self-evaluation. By contrast, activity in the central executive network […] and salience network […] is temporally anti-correlated with activity in the DMN and maximally active during active and contextually meaningful information processing", whereas "while SN and CEN activity across studies is seen to be greater as objective uncertainty increases, the DMN is recruited to a greater degree as subjective confidence increases", and that "exogenously (CEN and SN) and endogenously (DMN) focused brain systems play fundamentally contrasting roles in the evaluation of environmental certainty and its transferral to subjective awareness", where "the SN plays a crucial role in switching between these competing modes of brain function in diverse settings" (White, Engen, Sørensen, Overgaard, & Shergill, 2014, pp. 192, 196-197) .
Regression in the name of the ego is related to creativity (Suler, 1980, pp. 147-150) . This regression represents a simultaneous activation of CEN and DMN giving rise to "a rare combination of goal-directed and undirected thought processes, as well as cognitive and affective components" (Christoff, 2013, p. 326; Beaty et al., 2014) .
The concept of regression in the name of the ego represents a regression towards a lower level of functioning, that is, towards primary thought process functioning and with accordance to the principle of pleasure (Bush, 1969, pp. 159-169; Dimkov, 2015 Dimkov, , 2016 Dimkov, , 2018 Joffe & Peterson, 1981, pp. 337-340; Knafo, 2002, pp. 26-29; Kris, 1952; Martindale, 1999, pp. 138-139; Silverman, 1965; Suler, 1980, pp. 147-150) . Regression in Freudian sense is implicated in the process of creativity (Freud, 1908 (Freud, /1959 see Freud, 1910 see Freud, /1958 Suler, 1980, pp. 147-150) . For example, creativity can be viewed as a kind of disinhibition, which allows the generation of novel and useful ideas, involving both primary and secondary thought process features. In this line of reasoning, it has been found that CEN and DMN work jointly in creativity (Beaty et al., 2014; Beaty, Benedek, Kaufman, & Silvia, 2015; Bendetowicz et al., 2018; Bressler & Menon, 2010; Christoff, 2013, p. 326; Jung, Mead, Carrasco, & Flores, 2013; Takeuchi et al., 2012; Wei et al., 2014) . This is in agreement with the concept of regression in the name of the ego, namely that both primary and secondary thought processes are recruited simultaneously in creativity (Bush, 1969, pp. 159-169; Dimkov, 2015 Dimkov, , 2016 Dimkov, , 2018 Joffe & Peterson, 1981, pp. 337-340; Knafo, 2002, pp. 26-29; Kris, 1952; Martindale, 1999, pp. 138-139; Silverman, 1965; Suler, 1980, pp. 147-150) . This double activation is most probably supervised by SN and corresponds to an intermediary process, conceptualized as third thought process (Dimkov, 2015 (Dimkov, , 2016 (Dimkov, , 2018 .
Finally, DMN is hyperactive and its main nodes are hyperconnected in depression (Carhart-Harris, Mayberg, Malizia, & Nutt, 2008; Menon, 2011, p. 496) , representing a sign of a reduced CEN/SN inhibitory tone onto DMN iii (Bressler & Menon, 2010) , just as Freud thought that depression represents a lack of sufficient libidinal tonus from and within ego (reduced object cathexis), resulting in decreased focus onto external environment and towards the future (Carhart-Harris, Mayberg, Malizia, & Nutt, 2008; Freud, 1917 Freud, /1957 ).
On the one hand, from the above, it is suggested that the functions of the DMN are utterly unessential to survival and it starts to function when the external environment does not provide novel stimuli or when the externallyoriented brain networks are exhausted. Furthermore, this network functions spontaneously and thus corresponds to a regression, thus representing a low-level secondary thought processing or a third thought processing when functioning together with CEN during creativity, which represents a simultaneous activation of DMN and CEN. On the other hand, the functions of the two other networks, CEN and SN, thus presented, are identified to be the functions of the ego and the related secondary thought process and the principle of reality. SN monitors for salient stimuli and recruits CEN and the motor cortex for the execution of the established plan to act on identified salience, which is utterly essential for survivor.
Conclusion
Freudian meta-psychology attracts attention even today. pen due to the anti-correlation (functional antagonism) between the two large-scale networks. In fact, DMN appears to function as a third thought process, an intermediary process between the primary and the secondary ones.
Notes
i) There are also reports that 5-HT 2A receptor partial agonism leads to a decreased inner functional connectivity among large-scale brain networks along with an increased inter functional connectivity among the same large-scale brain networks (Kraehenmann et al., 2017a; Kraehenmann et al., 2017b; Müller, Dolder, Schmidt, Liechti, & Borgwardt, 2018; Nichols, 2016, p. 273; Northoff et al., 2006, p. 450; Palhano-Fontes et al., 2015) . All psychedelic drugs act as 5-HT 2A receptor partial agonists (Aghajanian & Marek, 1999) . With respect to the destabilizing effects of psychedelic drugs, it should be emphasized that "5-HT 2A receptor agonism leads to desynchronization of oscillatory activity, disintegration of intrinsic integrity in the DMN and related brain networks, and an overall brain dynamic characterized by increased between-network global functional connectivity, expanded signal diversity, and a larger repertoire of structured neurophysiological activation patterns" (Swanson, 2018, p. 11) . ii) Beaty et al., 2014, p. 1 : "the ability to generate creative ideas is characterized by increased functional connectivity between the inferior prefrontal cortex and the default network, pointing to a greater cooperation between brain regions associated with cognitive control and low-level imaginative processes." iii) According to Bressler and Menon (2010) , CEN and SN exert an inhibition on DMN. Thus, when CEN and SN are active, DMN should be inactivated and vice versa (functional anti-correlation).
